Alternatives for Regulatory Control of Acid Rain in the Northeastern United States

This Article will define regulatory options for curbing acid rain the northeastern United States. The first section will discuss those provisions of the Clean Air Act which address interstate air pollution. The second section examines the prominent proposals for amending the Clean Air Act to provide for acid rain regulation as enunciated by legislators, commentators and environmental organizations. The third section presents a two-pronged recommendation for broadening the Clean Air Act to prevent and control acid rain

Characteristics of unplanned termination. A follow-up study of ten treatment cases

Thesis (M.S.)--Boston UniversityThis was an exploratory study of factors related to unplanned termination of treatment. The cases of ten women who had been in casework at the Massachusetts Memorial Hospitals' Psychiatric Social Service Department and who had withdrawn from casework after five or more interviews were studied by examination of the records and by an interview with each subject. The following areas were investigated: the worker client relationship, the personal attributes of the client, the current environment, and the attitude of a significant person toward treatment. Analysis of the data indicated that the majority of discontinuers had not felt helped by their casework contact; that there had been some confusion for all subjects in one of the following areas: treatment goals, worker's role, or treatment plans; that important situational changes in the subject's environment around the time of discontinuance appeared to be directly related discontinuance,; that subjects tended to have more interests and activities at the time of discontinuance than they had at the beginning of treatment; and, that the attitude of a significant person toward treatment was positive more frequently around the time treatment began that it was around the time of discontinuance. It appeared that the factors examined may well influence a client's continuance in treatment

Moral Luck and The Unfairness of Morality

Moral luck occurs when factors beyond an agent’s control positively affect how much praise or blame she deserves. Kinds of moral luck are differentiated by the source of lack of control such as the results of her actions, the circumstances in which she finds herself, and the way in which she is constituted. Many philosophers accept the existence of some of these kinds of moral luck but not others, because, in their view, the existence of only some of them would make morality unfair. I, however, argue that this intermediary approach is unstable, because either morality is fair in ways that rule out resultant, circumstantial, and constitutive moral luck (and this leads to moral responsibility skepticism), or morality is unfair in ways that permit the existence of those kinds of moral luck. Thus, such intermediary approaches lack the motivation that their proponents have long taken them to have. In the appendix, I point to ways in which morality is unfair concerning the scope of moral responsibility, moral obligation, moral taint, being a good or bad person, and flourishing

Against the Character Solution to the Problem of Moral Luck

One way to frame the problem of moral luck is as a contradiction in our ordinary ideas about moral responsibility. In the case of two identical reckless drivers where one kills a pedestrian and the other does not, we tend to intuit that they are and are not equally blameworthy. The Character Response sorts these intuitions in part by providing an account of moral responsibility: the drivers must be equally blameworthy, because they have identical character traits and people are originally praiseworthy and blameworthy in virtue of, and only in virtue of, their character traits. After explicating two versions of the Character Response, I argue that they both involve implausible accounts of moral responsibility and fail to provide a good solution to the problem of moral luck. I close by noting how proponents of moral luck can preserve a kernel of truth from the Character Response to explain away the intuition that the drivers are equally blameworthy

Indirectly Free Actions, Libertarianism, and Resultant Moral Luck

Martin Luther affirms his theological position by saying “Here I stand. I can do no other.” Supposing that Luther’s claim is true, he lacks alternative possibilities at the moment of choice. Even so, many libertarians have the intuition that he is morally responsible for his action. One way to make sense of this intuition is to assert that Luther’s action is indirectly free, because his action inherits its freedom and moral responsibility from earlier actions when he had alternative possibilities and those earlier directly free actions formed him into the kind of person who must refrain from recanting. Surprisingly, libertarians have not developed a full account of indirectly free actions. I provide a more developed account. First, I explain the metaphysical nature of indirectly free actions such as Luther’s. Second, I examine the kind of metaphysical and epistemic connections that must occur between past directly free actions and the indirectly free action. Third, I argue that an attractive way to understand the kind of derivative moral responsibility at issue involves affirming the existence of resultant moral luck

Constitutive Moral Luck and Strawson's Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility

Galen Strawson’s Basic Argument is that because self-creation is required to be truly morally responsible and self-creation is impossible, it is impossible to be truly morally responsible for anything. I contend that the Basic Argument is unpersuasive and unsound. First, I argue that the moral luck debate shows that the self-creation requirement appears to be contradicted and supported by various parts of our commonsense ideas about moral responsibility, and that this ambivalence undermines the only reason that Strawson gives for the self-creation requirement. Second, I argue that the self-creation requirement is so demanding that either it is an implausible requirement for a species of true moral responsibility that we take ourselves to have or it is a plausible requirement of a species of true moral responsibility that we have never taken ourselves to have. Third, I explain that Strawson overgeneralizes from instances of constitutive luck that obviously undermine moral responsibility to all kinds of constitutive luck

Accepting Moral Luck

I argue that certain kinds of luck can partially determine an agent’s praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. To make this view clearer, consider some examples. Two identical agents drive recklessly around a curb, and one but not the other kills a pedestrian. Two identical corrupt judges would freely take a bribe if one were offered. Only one judge is offered a bribe, and so only one judge takes a bribe. Put in terms of these examples, I argue that the killer driver and bribe taker are more blameworthy than their counterparts. I offer three arguments for that view, and, in doing so, I exemplify a general way to advance the moral luck debate. First, I argue against an account of moral responsibility that implies that the judges are equally blameworthy. Second, I argue that the killer driver is more blameworthy than the merely reckless driver. Third, I locate an alternative sense in which the agents in each case pair are morally on par

The Trend of Future Gas Turbine Technology

Turbomachinery system component research to advance the technology of aviation turbofan and turbojet engines is discussed. Areas of research include compressors, turbines, internal flow analysis, combustion, fuels, materials, structures, bearings, seals, lubrication, dynamics and controls, and instrumentation. A review of the research directions being taken in these areas and the steady advances being made provides a reasonable glimpse at gas turbine technology of the future

Armstrong on Probabilistic Laws of Nature

D. M. Armstrong famously claims that deterministic laws of nature are contingent relations between universals and that his account can also be straightforwardly extended to irreducibly probabilistic laws of nature. For the most part, philosophers have neglected to scrutinize Armstrong’s account of probabilistic laws. This is surprising precisely because his own claims about probabilistic laws make it unclear just what he takes them to be. We offer three interpretations of what Armstrong-style probabilistic laws are, and argue that all three interpretations are incompatible either with some feature of Armstrong’s broader metaphysics or with essential features of his account of laws (or both)

Breast cancer relatives' physical activity intervention needs and preferences: qualitative results.

BackgroundWhile many risk factors for breast cancer, such as family history, are not modifiable, some, however, can be modified. The study used formative qualitative research to learn about the physical activity intervention preferences and needs of first-degree female relatives (FDFRs) of breast cancer patients; that information was then used to develop a targeted physical activity intervention.MethodsTwenty FDFRs first completed a 12-week physical activity intervention and then attended two sequential focus groups (7 groups total). In the first set of focus groups participants provided feedback on the intervention. In the follow-up focus groups, proposed changes based on collected responses from the first groups were presented and participants provided feedback to further refine the intervention.ResultsOverall, we found strong interest for an intervention using breast cancer-related health concerns to promote positive behavior change. A theme underlying all of the feedback was the desire for a personalized intervention that was directly relevant to their lives. Participants wanted this personalization achieved through individually tailored content and incorporation of stories from other FDFRs. In order to successfully use concerns about breast cancer to motivate behavior change, participants also wanted a discussion about their individual risk factors for breast cancer including, but not limited to, lack of physical activity.ConclusionsThis study demonstrates women's interest in receiving personalized information and highlights specific ways to individualize an intervention that increases motivation and engagement. Using a sequential qualitative approach was effective for formative intervention development.Trial registration numberNCT03115658 (Retrospectively registered 4/13/17)